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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
WILLIAM J. ACEVES† 
INTRODUCTION 
The human rights movement has long sought to find 
arguments in support of rights that do not rely solely on morality 
or normative suasion.1  Granted, some scholars, from Amartya 
Sen to Ronald Dworkin, argue that human rights are worth 
protecting even if it is inefficient to do so.2  Other scholars, 
including Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, suggest that 
states have a responsibility to protect human rights as a basic 
obligation that arises from their sovereign status within the 
international community.3  But, such calls are often met with 
skepticism, particularly by governments that must make difficult 
resource allocation decisions.4  Protecting human rights can be a 
costly endeavor.  Not all rights can be protected, and trade-offs 
are inevitable.5 
 
† William J. Aceves is the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California 
Western School of Law. Beth Van Schaack and Donald Smythe offered helpful 
comments on earlier drafts. Regina Calvario, Erin Dimbleby, Laura Goolsby, 
Warsame Hassan, Sahar Karimi, and Melia Thompson-Dudiak provided excellent 
research assistance. All errors and opinions are the author’s sole responsibility. 
1 See, e.g., ARI KOHEN, IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A NON-RELIGIOUS 
GROUNDING IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD 3 (2007); WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, IN OUR OWN 
BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS BENEFITS US ALL 6–7 (2001); 
KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 15–16 (2017). 
2 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24–25 (1977); AMARTYA SEN, 
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (1999); cf. SIKKINK, supra note 1, at 16; Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 281 (1997). 
3 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 13 (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ 
ICISS%20Report.pdf; see also RUTI G. TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 108 (2011); Anne 
Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 522–26 
(2009). 
4 Cf. Aoife Nolan, Not Fit for Purpose? Human Rights in Times of Financial and 
Economic Crisis, 2015 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 360, 368–69 (2015); Lutz Oette, 
Austerity and the Limits of Policy-Induced Suffering: What Role for the Prohibition of 
Torture and Other Ill-Treatment?, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 669, 670 (2015). 
5 See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY 
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Costs of Enforcing Legal 
Rights, 4 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 71–73 (1995). Studies on the costs of human rights 
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This Article considers whether cost-benefit analysis can 
provide the human rights movement with the answers it seeks.6  
It offers an instrumentalist and empirical approach to 
complement the normative arguments that are most often used 
by the human rights movement.  If human rights could be fully 
monetized, states could consider the full range of benefits that 
arise from protecting rights and the costs that occur when rights 
are violated.  This approach could provide states with a more 
accurate methodology for making decisions that affect human 
rights.  In fact, protecting human rights may prove to be cost-
effective, particularly when second order costs are considered, 
thereby offering a compelling argument for their defense.7 
I. THE CALCULUS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Cost-benefit analysis is a commonly used decision-making 
methodology that facilitates the allocation of state resources and 
the selection of economically efficient policies.8  This methodology 
requires the monetization of all relevant costs and benefits.  
Some costs and benefits are easy to monetize; others are not.  
When values cannot be readily monetized, they must still be 
incorporated into the analysis.  Through the monetization of all 
relevant values, cost-benefit analysis quantifies the risks and 
rewards of discrete decisions.9  This allows for effective 
 
typically address economic, social, and cultural rights. See generally Eitan Felner, 
Closing the ‘Escape Hatch’: A Toolkit to Monitor the Progressive Realization of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 402 (2009). 
6 Some commentators suggest that advocates should use cost-benefit analysis 
because it is “here to stay” and can offer unique opportunities. See MICHAEL A. 
LIVERMORE & RICHARD L. REVESZ, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10–11 (2008); 
Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Retaking Rationality Two Years Later, 
48 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“By learning how to use cost-benefit analysis to 
advance their agendas, protection-oriented groups (such as environmentalists, labor 
unions, and consumer groups) could help correct historical biases and bad practices 
that have crept into the methodology of cost-benefit analysis.”). 
7 In recent years, the use of rational choice methods to study international law 
has grown in prominence. See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
249 (Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi eds., 2016); RESEARCH METHODS IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK 229, 257 n.14, 261 (Bård A. Andreassen et al. eds., 
2017). For one of the earliest studies, see William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis 
of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the Concept of State Practice, 
17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 995 (1996). 
8 See LIVERMORE & REVESZ, supra note 6, at 12. 
9 See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to The 
Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1054 (2004). See generally William Meadow & Cass 
R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629 (2001). Cost-benefit analysis is 
2018] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 433 
comparisons between competing policies.  Through such 
comparative methodology, cost-benefit analysis can facilitate the 
selection of the most economically efficient policies.10 
Governments regularly use cost-benefit analysis to make a 
broad array of decisions.11  Indeed, this methodology has become 
a centerpiece of the modern regulatory state.  Government 
agencies are often required to conduct cost-benefit analysis when 
considering policies that may have a significant political, 
economic, or social impact.  As a result, regulations on 
environmental standards, health requirements, transportation 
rules, and worker safety protocols have been considered and 
adopted when their monetized benefits exceeded expected costs.12  
On other occasions, proposed regulations have been rejected 
when their costs would exceed expected benefits.13 
In the United States, federal agencies are required by 
Executive Order 12,866 to use cost-benefit analysis when making 
regulatory decisions.14  This analysis must consider “both 
quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be 
usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and 
benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential 
 
one of several decision-making methods. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, 
TRAGIC CHOICES 31–49 (1978). The precautionary principle, which counsels caution 
in the face of uncertainty, offers a competing methodology. DANIEL STEEL, 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 2 (2015). 
10 See generally ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (5th 
ed. 2018); COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); RISKS, COSTS, AND 
LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn ed., 
1996); HAROLD WINTER, TRADE-OFFS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC REASONING 
AND SOCIAL ISSUES (2005). 
11 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 3–4 
(2014). Some countries are less receptive to the use of cost-benefit analysis in the 
decision-making process. Marion Fourcade, The Political Valuation of Life, 3 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 291, 295–96 (2009). 
12 While commonly used, cost-benefit analysis is subject to significant criticism. 
See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 92–114 (2012); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM 
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 46 (2010); 
Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
971, 975 (2000). 
13 SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 17–18. 
14 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Lisa A. 
Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk Reductions, 1 REV. 
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 283, 285 (2007). See generally STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (7th ed. 2011); CHRISTOPHER HOOD 
ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES 
(2001). 
434 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:431   
to consider.”15  In addition, federal agencies undertaking 
“significant regulatory action” are required to prepare detailed 
regulatory assessment plans that consider the costs and benefits 
of proposed action.  These plans are required when regulatory 
action would result in a rule that may “[h]ave an annual effect on 
the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a 
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or 
State, local, or tribal governments or communities.”16  Regulatory 
assessment plans must be submitted for review and approval to 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), which 
is located within the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”).17  With limited exceptions, decisions to accept or reject 
regulations that constitute significant regulatory action are made 
using cost-benefit analysis.  If the anticipated benefits exceed the 
costs, OIRA will approve the regulations.  If the anticipated costs 
exceed the benefits, OIRA will reject the regulations unless a law 
requires their adoption.18 
Cost-benefit analysis is also used outside the United States.  
For example, cost-benefit analysis has been used to study large-
scale water projects in India and China.19  Researchers have used 
cost-benefit principles to study deforestation in the Amazon 
 
15 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. § 1(a). 
16 Id. § 3(f). A “significant regulatory action” is also defined to include rules that 
may “[c]reate a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or 
planned by another agency,” that may “[m]aterially alter the budgetary impact of 
entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of 
recipients thereof,” or that may “[r]aise novel legal or policy issues arising out of 
legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in this 
Executive order.” Id. 
17 SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 16–26. For a recent example of a regulatory 
impact analysis, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR 
THE PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM 
EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS: REVISIONS TO EMISSION 
GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW 
PROGRAM (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/util 
ities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf. See generally Christopher Aluka Berry, Trump’s 
New Power Plan Comes with a Deadly Price, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/trump-new-power-plan-air-pollution-deaths/. 
18 See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 519–22 (1981) 
(concluding that Congress required the implementation of appropriate regulatory 
standards to protect worker health even if such regulations were unsupported by 
cost-benefit analysis). 
19 See generally Hisham El-Bihbety & Harvey Lithwick, Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Water Management Mega-Projects in India and China, in THE ARID FRONTIER: 
INTERACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 295 (Hendrik J. 
Bruins & Harvey Lithwick eds., 1998). 
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region.20  From air pollution in Singapore to fuel standards in 
Mexico, the principles of cost-benefit analysis have been used on 
countless occasions throughout the world to assess government 
policies.21  Its effectiveness as a decision-making methodology is 
evidenced by its ability to address such a diverse array of issues 
in an equally diverse group of countries. 
Cost-benefit analysis is used by private entities as well as 
governments.  For example, corporations routinely use cost-
benefit analysis in their decision-making processes.  On some 
occasions, corporations use this methodology in deciding whether 
to pursue certain business ventures.  On other occasions, 
corporations use cost-benefit analysis to engage in risk 
assessment, such as whether to install safety features in their 
products.22  Even individuals make personal choices—from using 
certain modes of transportation to selecting particular medical 
procedures—that involve the simple balancing of financial costs 
and personal benefits.23  The prevalence of cost-benefit analysis 
as a decision-making methodology is explained, in part, by its 
simplicity.  As noted by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 
“people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which 
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”24  Thus, 
many private decisions are made through cost-benefit analysis.  
But whereas corporations and individuals are concerned about 
private welfare, governments must consider the social costs of 
their decisions. 
 
20 See generally LYKKE E. ANDERSEN, A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF 
DEFORESTATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON 27 (1998). 
21 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore et al., Global Cost-Benefit Analysis, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 3, 10 
(Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013). 
22 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 547, 572–73 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Pricing Lives for Corporate and 
Governmental Risk Decisions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2015); cf. Gary T. 
Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1991). 
23 See, e.g., Glenn C. Blomquist et al., Values of Risk Reduction Implied by 
Motorist Use of Protection Equipment: New Evidence from Different Populations, 20 
J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL’Y 55, 55 (1996); Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, 
The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 97, 
116–17 (1989); Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and 
Consumer Valuations of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. & ECON. 79, 
80 (1995); Jahn K. Hakes & W. Kip Viscusi, Automobile Seatbelt Usage and the 
Value of Statistical Life, 73 S. ECON. J. 659, 661 (2007). 
24 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974). 
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II. THE VALUE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
To those who study human rights (and to those who promote 
these rights), cost-benefit analysis offers an intriguing and 
provocative opportunity.  State action in support of human rights 
is often criticized as being ineffective or inefficient.25  Protecting 
human rights is also seen as an expensive proposition.26  While 
such criticisms are quick to point out the financial costs of 
protecting rights, they seldom engage in a rigorous assessment of 
the monetized and non-monetized benefits.27 
Assessing the benefits of protecting human rights requires 
consideration of the costs that occur when rights are violated.  If 
human rights could be quantified through the conversion of 
monetary and non-monetary costs and benefits into a common 
unit of measure, states could more accurately consider the net 
benefits of protecting human rights.  Perhaps the most 
undertheorized benefit is the value of the human right itself, 
which involves the monetized benefit of avoiding the loss of that 
right.  This can be assessed through contingent valuation.28  For 
example, stated preference studies use surveys to measure how 
much people would be willing to pay in order to reduce or 
eliminate discrete threats or harms.29  Revealed preference 
studies use observational data of human behavior to make 
similar determinations.30  Other related benefits—or co-
benefits—that arise from the protection of human rights can 
include the ongoing social and economic productivity of those 
individuals whose rights are not violated.  When these values are 
extrapolated across an entire population, the monetized benefits 
of protecting human rights are significant.  Many of these 
benefits are recurring.  These future benefits must also be 
incorporated into the analysis, subject to an appropriate discount 
rate. 
 
25 See, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a 
Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1382–84 
(2005); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE 
RES. 95, 95 (1999); cf. Varun Gauri, Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health 
Care and Education in Developing Countries, 32 WORLD DEV. 465, 467–68 (2004). 
26 Gauri, supra note 25, at 467, 472. 
27 Id. at 472–73. 
28 See, e.g., Ike Brannon, What is a Life Worth?, 27 REG. 60, 61 (2004). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 60–61. 
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Other benefits merit consideration.31  These include the 
emotional benefits that accrue to the family and friends of 
individuals whose rights are not violated.  They can include the 
moral interests of community members who value the human 
right and would suffer from its loss.  Other non-monetized 
benefits which inure to the benefit of the country that protects 
human rights include promotion of the rule of law and political 
stability.32  Diplomatic benefits may also accrue. 
Admittedly, not all the benefits that result from the 
protection of human rights can be readily monetized or subject to 
contingent valuation studies.  And yet, these non-monetized 
benefits can be significant and should be incorporated into the 
analysis.  These non-monetized benefits can be assessed through 
breakeven analysis, which considers how significant these 
benefits would need to be in order to justify their costs.33  
Breakeven analysis can be used to identify the value of a 
proposed benefit even when that benefit is not amenable to 
standard monetization.  It functions through a process of 
inductive reasoning by using the known costs to determine the 
benefits needed to justify those costs.  Breakeven analysis is 
regularly used in cost-benefit studies to ensure that even non-
monetized benefits are considered.34 
It may seem puzzling to consider the financial benefits 
associated with the prevention of human rights abuses.  But, in 
fact, similar studies are routinely performed to assess the 
financial benefits of crime prevention.35  These studies consider 
both the tangible and intangible costs of crime and the 
corresponding benefits associated with crime prevention.  The 
 
31 See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809 (2017). 
32 See, e.g., Ariel Benyishay & Roger R. Betancourt, Civil Liberties and 
Economic Development, 6 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 281, 283 (2010); Lorenz Blume & 
Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Human Rights, 60 KYKLOS 509, 518–24 (2007); 
Axel Dreher et al., Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human Rights, 56 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 516, 522–24 (2012). 
33 SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 65–66; Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of 
Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1375–79 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, The 
Limits of Quantification]. 
34 Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, supra note 33, at 1385–89. 
35 See, e.g., Brandon C. Welsh et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis of Crime Prevention 
Programs, 44 CRIME & JUST. 447, 447–49 (2015); see also COUNCIL OF ECON. 
ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON 
INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 34–36 (2016); John Roman, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Criminal Justice Reforms, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Sept. 2013, 
at 30, 31.  
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benefits of crime prevention can include the cost savings to 
victims, taxpayers, and even to perpetrators.36  By calculating the 
costs of discrete crimes—from murder and rape to even low-level 
offenses—governments can determine the appropriate allocation 
of state resources to protect society. 
The Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) provides a good 
example of cost-benefit analysis in the crime prevention field.  
Congress adopted PREA in 2003 to address the ongoing problem 
of sexual abuse in the U.S. prison system.37  PREA established 
the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, which was 
tasked with investigating the causes of sexual abuse in the 
prison system and considering potential solutions.  In 2009, the 
Commission issued its findings, including an extensive list of 
recommendations.38  Based on these recommendations, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) developed a proposed set of 
regulations that were then subjected to public review.39 
As part of the regulatory review process, the DOJ performed 
a cost-benefit analysis that compared the costs of implementing 
the proposed regulations with the benefits associated with the 
reduction of sexual abuse in the prison system.40  In calculating 
the proposed benefits, DOJ considered the value associated with 
the monetized benefits of avoiding sexual abuse.41  This value 
was then compared with the anticipated costs of 
implementation.42  Through a rigorous assessment of these costs 
and benefits, the study concluded that the proposed benefits of 
implementation would exceed the expected costs.  Indeed, the 
 
36 CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & JOSHUA RINALDI, VERA INST. OF JUST., COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUSTICE POLICY TOOLKIT 16–20 (2014), https://storage.goog 
leapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/cost-benefit-analysis-and-justice-
policy-toolkit/legacy_downloads/cba-justice-policy-toolkit.pdf; JENNIFER ROSENBERG 
& SARA MARK, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, BALANCED JUSTICE: COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 10 (2011), https://policyinteg 
rity.org/publications/detail/balanced-justice/. 
37 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 
(2003). 
38 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE 
ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 237 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
226680.pdf. 
39 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT REGULATORY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 9–11 (2012), https://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_ria.pdf. 
40 See generally id. 
41 Id. at 39–69. 
42 Id. at 70–156. See generally BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, PRISON RAPE 
ELIMINATION ACT (PREA) COST IMPACT ANALYSIS: FINAL REPORT (2010), 
https://ojp.gov/programs/pdfs/preacostimpactanalysis.pdf. 
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calculations were striking.  The costs of implementing the PREA 
regulations were approximately $468 million, whereas the 
benefits in eliminating sexual abuse could reach $52 billion 
annually.43  This amount did not include several non-monetized 
benefits, such as the benefits that would accrue to society by 
avoiding sexual violence.44  Eventually, the PREA regulations 
were adopted.45 
This example is by no means unique.  Cost-benefit analysis 
has been used in a variety of areas that implicate human rights.  
For example, the rights of persons with disabilities have been the 
subject of several cost-benefit studies as part of the review and 
approval process for federal regulations implementing the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).46  These studies 
assessed both the monetized and non-monetized benefits of the 
proposed ADA regulations.47  Cost-benefit studies have also been 
conducted to assess what constitutes acceptable levels of 
carcinogens in the water supply or pollutants in the air, both of 
which implicate the quality of life and life itself.48 
In sum, cost-benefit analysis could provide states with an 
innovative methodology for making decisions that affect human 
rights.  By monetizing human rights, states could determine 
which rights are cost-effective, and should be protected, and 
which could be deferred because their costs exceed potential 
benefits.  Moreover, if rights cannot be protected at any cost, it 
would be inefficient to allocate resources to protect them.  This 
analysis could be performed on a variety of human rights, from 
civil and political rights to economic, social, and cultural rights.  
If the goal of human rights is to promote social welfare, cost- 
 
 
 
43 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 1–2. 
44 Id. at 66–69. 
45 28 C.F.R. § 115.11(a) (2018). 
46 SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 76–77; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 (2018). 
47 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE 
FINAL REVISED REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING TITLES II AND III OF THE ADA, 
INCLUDING REVISED ADA STANDARDS FOR ACCESSIBLE DESIGN (2010), 
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/RIA_2010regs/DOJ%20ADA%20Final%20RIA.pdf. 
48 SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 55–59, 94; see also Benefits and Costs of the 
Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-
overview/benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act (last visited Nov. 15, 2018); Economic 
Analysis and Statutory Requirements, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/dwregdev/economic-analysis-and-statutory-requirements (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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benefit analysis offers a viable and tested methodology to assess 
the success or failure of such efforts.  Human rights advocates 
could also use this methodology in their own advocacy work. 
III. APPLYING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
The principles of cost-benefit analysis can be applied to 
human rights in several ways.  In the United States, federal 
agencies are required to consider whether a proposed treaty 
would result in significant regulatory action.49  If so, the 
applicable federal agency must consult with OIRA and convey 
the outcome of such consultations to the U.S. Department of 
State.50  This obligation is codified in the Foreign Affairs Manual, 
which governs the operations of the Department of State.51 
If a proposed agreement embodies a commitment 
that could reasonably be expected to require (for 
its implementation) the issuance of a significant 
regulatory action (as defined in section 3 of 
Executive Order 12866), the agency proposing the 
arrangement shall state what arrangements have 
been planned or carried out concerning timely 
consultation with the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for such commitment.  The 
Department of State should receive confirmation 
that OMB has been consulted in a timely manner 
concerning the proposed commitment.52 
 
49 See Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, Comparing Regulatory 
Oversight Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs in the US and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU, in COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 309, 328 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 
2010). 
50 In addition to the requirements of Executive Order 12,866, Executive Order 
13,609 was adopted in 2012 to promote international cooperation in regulatory 
matters. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 (May 1, 2012). Such 
cooperation would facilitate the work of federal agencies and their foreign 
counterparts “[i]n meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, 
security, environmental, and other issues, . . . [and] can also reduce, eliminate, or 
prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.” Id. § 1. 
51 Publication, Coordination, and Reporting of International Agreements: 
Amendments, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,831 (May 18, 2006) (codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 181). 
52 22 C.F.R. § 181.4(e)(2) (2018). See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS MANUAL § 724.3(e) (2006) (requiring that action memorandum “shall 
indicate whether a proposed treaty or agreement embodies a commitment that could 
reasonably be expected to require (for its implementation) the issuance of a 
‘significant regulatory action’ (as defined in section 3 of Executive Order 12866); and 
if so, what arrangements are being planned or carried out concerning timely 
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Despite these provisions, it does not appear that any regulations 
or rules arising from human rights treaties under consideration 
by the United States have been subjected to cost-benefit analysis, 
regulatory impact assessments, or any form of OIRA review. 
There may be several reasons why human rights treaties 
have not been subject to the rigors of cost-benefit analysis.  Some 
regulations and rules that may arise out of a proposed treaty 
may simply be excluded from the regulatory review process by 
the terms of Executive Order 12,866.53  This order excludes 
regulations or rules that pertain to a military or foreign affairs 
function of the United States.54  Other regulations and rules may 
also fall outside the definition of significant regulatory action 
because they do not have an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more or they do not otherwise adversely affect the 
economy.55  Government statements made during the treaty 
ratification process often result in the exclusion of regulations 
and rules from cost-benefit analysis.  To gain domestic support 
for ratification, for example, the U.S. Senate regularly attaches 
declarations of non-self-execution to human rights treaties.  
Essentially, these declarations limit the domestic “costs” of treaty 
implementation by indicating that a treaty will not give rise to 
enforceable rights or domestic obligations in the absence of 
further congressional action.56  Such declarations may forestall 
the need for any regulations or rules.  In addition, the Executive 
branch will often assert that a treaty will not result in any 
significant changes to U.S. law or practice.57  While these 
 
consultation with OMB.”). In addition, federal agencies are required to consult with 
OMB if a proposed international agreement “embodies a commitment to furnish 
funds, goods, or services that are beyond or in addition to those authorized in an 
approved budget.” 22 C.F.R. § 181.4(e)(1). 
53 See, e.g., Implementation of the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty Between 
the United States and the United Kingdom, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,592, 16,596 (Mar. 21, 
2012) (“The Department is of the opinion that restricting defense articles exports is a 
foreign affairs function of the United States Government and that rules governing 
the conduct of this function are exempt from the requirements of Executive order 
12866.”). 
54 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 3(d)(2) (Sept. 30, 1993). 
55 Id. § 3(f). 
56 See David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to 
Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 145–46, 153 (2012); 
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 695, 703–04 (1995). 
57 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, June 30, 
2009, S. TREATY DOC. No. 112-7 (2009) (stating that Convention provisions cannot be 
directly enforced by U.S. courts or give rise to individually enforceable rights in the 
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statements are made to gain support for ratification, they may 
actually be counterproductive because they do not allow for 
meaningful assessment of the costs and benefits of a proposed 
treaty. 
In cases of human rights treaties, the regulatory assessment 
process may also be limited because it only focuses “on benefits 
and costs that accrue to citizens and residents of the United 
States.”58  If a federal regulation will have an impact outside the 
United States, such effects are reported separately.59  Bifurcating 
the domestic and foreign effects of a proposed treaty may be 
reasonable because it highlights the unique domestic costs and 
benefits that flow from proposed regulatory action.  However, 
foreign effects should not be wholly excluded from the analysis 
because they may also provide both costs and benefits to the 
United States.60 
Cost-benefit analysis may thus offer an important 
contribution to treaty ratification debates in the United States.61  
A regulatory impact assessment that fully monetizes the benefits 
of protecting human rights, including the costs that occur when 
rights are violated, could justify  ratification of long-stalled 
treaties, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities.62  The arguments used against these treaties 
 
United States); S. REP. NO. 112-6, at 9 (2012) (stating that key Convention terms 
should be defined to be coextensive with terms in existing U.S. law); cf. Yvonne M. 
Dutton, Commitment to International Human Rights Treaties: The Role of 
Enforcement Mechanisms, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–16 (2012); Oona A. Hathaway, 
The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1822, 1832, 1856 (2003). 
58 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
CIRCULAR No. A-4 (2003). 
59 Id. 
60 See Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. 499, 
573 (2014). 
61 See, e.g., Have Human Rights Treaties Failed?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/28/have-human-rights-treaties-
failed. 
62 See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, The Time Has Come for the United States to 
Ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 195, 196 (2010); Tara J. Melish, The UN 
Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should 
Ratify, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 37, 42 (2007); Martha Middleton, The Last Holdout, ABA 
J., Mar. 2016, at 64; Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children? A 
Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 172 (2006); cf. Lawrence A. Kogan, What Goes 
Around Comes Around: How UNCLOS Ratification Will Herald Europe’s 
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typically do not address the monetized benefits of protecting 
human rights.63  And, they do not assess these benefits against 
the costs of treaty implementation.  Cost-benefit analysis could 
thus be used to complement the normative arguments made in 
support of ratification.  Of course, such analysis could provide 
reasons against ratification.64 
Cost-benefit analysis may also offer insights into the study of 
human rights.  In recent years, questions surrounding treaty 
ratification and compliance have received significant 
consideration.65  Why do states ratify some human rights treaties 
and not others?  Why do states comply with some treaty 
obligations and not others?  A rigorous analysis that monetizes 
the costs and benefits of protecting human rights may reveal 
unique values that have not been considered in prior studies.  
This may explain why states ratify certain treaties and allocate 
more resources to comply with certain treaty obligations.66  This 
 
Precautionary Principle as U.S. Law, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 23, 155–56 (2009) 
(arguing that the regulatory requirements of Executive Order 12,866 should apply to 
discussions on the proposed ratification of UNCLOS). 
63 But see Varun Gauri, The Cost of Complying with Human Rights Treaties: 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child and Basic Immunization, 6 REV. INT’L 
ORGS. 33 (2011). 
64 As a general matter, cost-benefit analysis does not address normative 
(political) arguments. See generally THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE 
PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1996). But see Louis E. 
Wolcher, Senseless Kindness: The Politics of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 25 LAW & INEQ. 
147 (2007). 
65 Treaty compliance is of significant interest to lawyers, economists, and 
political scientists. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, The Influence of 
History on States’ Compliance with Human Rights Obligations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 211 
(2016); Geoff Dancy & Kathryn Sikkink, Ratification and Human Rights 
Prosecutions: Toward a Transnational Theory of Treaty Compliance, 44 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 751 (2012); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of 
Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & 
James Ron, Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact Through Qualitative and 
Quantitative Eyes, 61 WORLD POL. 360 (2009); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human 
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Daniel W. Hill, Jr., 
Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161 
(2010); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000); Richard A. Nielsen & Beth 
A. Simmons, Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International 
Human Rights Regime?, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 197 (2015); Wayne Sandholtz, Domestic 
Law and Human Rights Treaty Commitments: The Convention against Torture, 16 J. 
HUM. RTS. 25 (2017); Beth A. Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 273 (2010). 
66 See, e.g., Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 29 (2006) (“Undoubtedly most states generally 
place their own economic self-interest above principled responses to human rights 
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approach offers a competing empirical narrative to critiques that 
question the efficacy and relevance of human rights treaties.67 
The use of cost-benefit analysis need not be limited to the 
study of treaties.  It can also be used to study the development of, 
and compliance with, customary international law.68  By 
monetizing the costs and benefits of accepting and complying 
with customary norms, cost-benefit analysis can offer some 
clarity to the study of human rights norms that have not yet been 
codified but are still binding on states.69  It could explain, for 
example, why some norms rise to the level of custom through 
consistent state practice and others do not.  It could even explain 
why some customary norms are more likely to be complied with 
than other norms. 
In addition to studying the decisions of individual states, 
cost-benefit analysis could be used to examine multilateral 
efforts to protect human rights.  The principles of cost-benefit 
analysis apply with equal rigor to multilateral efforts.  For 
example, the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”) movement has 
gained greater traction in recent years as the United Nations 
seeks to convince states of their obligation to prevent serious 
human rights abuses.70  The R2P movement calls for collective 
state action to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and other serious human rights abuses.71  
Presumably, the principles underlying the R2P movement could 
 
conditions outside their own territory.”); Simon SC Tay, Southeast Asian Fires: The 
Challenge for International Environmental Law and Sustainable Development, 11 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 289−90 (1999) (“Common sense dictates that 
cooperation will only succeed if, for all parties, the benefits exceed the cost.”). 
67 See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). But see 
Neil A. Englehart & Melissa K. Miller, The CEDAW Effect: International Law’s 
Impact on Women’s Rights, 13 J. HUM. RTS. 22 (2014); Christopher J. Fariss, Respect 
for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standards of 
Accountability, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (2014). 
68 See, e.g., Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent, Compliance and 
Change in Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 
389, 399–404 (2014) (suggesting that cost-benefit analysis plays a role in 
determining whether a state complies with customary international law). 
69 For other efforts to assess customary international law, see id. at 394; George 
Norman & Joel Trachtman, Measuring the Shadow of the Future: An Introduction to 
the Game Theory of Customary International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 127, 129–30 
(2008). 
70 See, e.g., ALEX J. BELLAMY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A DEFENSE 1, 
4–5, 7 (2015) (providing a brief history of R2P and how the United Nations Security 
Council adopted resolutions reaffirming R2P); THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 7–12 (W. Andy Knight & Frazer Egerton eds., 2012). 
71 G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
2018] COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 445 
be extended to any acts that pose significant harms to human 
life.72  Arguments in support of the R2P movement have often 
focused on normative and legal justifications.73  Arguments 
against the R2P movement raise resource limitations and also 
legal concerns.74  By monetizing human rights and comparing the 
benefits of protecting these rights with their attendant costs, 
cost-benefit analysis could offer empirical support for 
humanitarian intervention.  Indeed, the influential Albright-
Cohen report on atrocity prevention makes clear that preventive 
action is more cost-effective than inaction.75  Efforts to promote 
international cooperation on other matters of global concern, 
such as climate change or famine relief, could likewise gain 
greater support through rigorous cost-benefit analysis.76  If 
human rights are monetizable, the benefits of intervention may 
be easier to see and harder to ignore. 
 
 
 
 
72 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at 
viii. 
73 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (5th ed. 2015); Terry Nardin, From Right to Intervene to 
Duty to Protect: Michael Walzer on Humanitarian Intervention, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
67, 68–70 (2013); Chris O’Meara, Should International Law Recognize a Right of 
Humanitarian Intervention?, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 441, 443–44, 447, 451 (2017). 
74 Kim R. Holmes, The Weakness of the Responsibility to Protect as an 
International Norm, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 7, 2014), 
https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-weakness-the-responsibility-
protect-international-norm; see, e.g., David Fetherstonhaugh et al., Insensitivity to 
the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychological Numbing, 14 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 283, 284, 298–99 (1997); Paul Slovic et al., Psychic Numbing and 
Mass Atrocity, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 126, 134–37 
(Eldar Shafir ed., 2012); Paul Slovic, When (In)action Speaks Louder than Words: 
Confronting the Collapse of Humanitarian Values in Foreign Policy Decisions, 2015 
U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 24, 25, 27 (2015); Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign 
Lives in Genocides & Mass Atrocities: Law, Humanitarian Intervention, and the 
Prominence Effect, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 32, 34–36 (2015). 
75 GENOCIDE PREVENTION TASK FORCE, PREVENTING GENOCIDE: A BLUEPRINT 
FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS, at xv (2008) (“If the United States does not engage early in 
preventing these crimes, we inevitably bear greater costs—in feeding millions of 
refugees and trying to manage long-lasting regional crises.”). 
76 See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS: A GUIDE TO RESOLVING DISPUTES 
AND FACILITATING MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 3–35 (Gunnar Sjöstedt & Ariel 
Macaspac Penetrante eds., 2013); Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime 
Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP. POL. 7, 7, 16–17 (2011). 
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IV. THE LIMITS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The use of cost-benefit analysis is not without its critics, 
many of whom question the appropriateness and accuracy of the 
valuation process.77  These criticisms are magnified when human 
rights are at issue.78  As Sally Engle Merry has written, the 
process of quantification “risks distorting the complexity of social 
phenomena.”79  While it allows for effective comparisons, it also 
strips norms “of their context, history, and meaning.”80  In fact, 
such criticisms were leveled at the PREA regulatory approval 
process, even though that process eventually concluded that 
preventing sexual violence in the prison system was cost-
effective.81  The criticisms were twofold. 
First, protecting individuals from egregious human rights 
abuses, such as sexual violence, should not be conditioned on 
whether it is financially feasible to do so.  Critics argued that 
individuals should always be protected from such harms 
regardless of the costs.  In criticizing the PREA regulatory 
approval process, Lisa Heinzerling challenged the suggestion 
that cost-benefit analysis was an appropriate methodology for 
determining whether individuals were entitled to protection from 
sexual violence: “In the topsy-turvy world of cost-benefit analysis, 
DOJ was compelled to treat rape as just another market 
exchange, coercion as a side note, and the elimination of prison 
rape as a good idea only if the economic numbers happened to 
come out that way.”82  Ronald Dworkin has offered a similar 
criticism of cost-benefit analysis when he noted that some harms  
 
 
77 See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9 (2004). 
78 See, e.g., William J. Aceves, Valuing Life: A Human Rights Perspective on the 
Calculus of Regulation, 36 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3 & n.12 (2018). 
79 SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING 
HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX TRAFFICKING 1 (2016). But see José-
Miguel Bello y Villarino & Ramona Vijeyarasa, The Indicator Fad: How Quantifiable 
Measurement Can Work Hand-in-Hand with Human Rights—A Response to Sally 
Engle Merry’s The Seductions of Quantification, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 985 
(2018). 
80 MERRY, supra note 79, at 1. While Merry acknowledges the “power of 
quantitative knowledge,” she urges restraint in its application and a clear 
understanding of how data is compiled and assessed. Id. at 26. 
81 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 39, at 1–2. 
82 Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit Jumps the Shark: The Department of Justice’s 
Economic Analysis of Prison Rape, GEO. L. FAC. BLOG (June 13, 2012), 
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law/2012/06/cost-benefit-jumps-
the-shark.html. 
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are so egregious they cannot be assessed through mathematical 
calculations and that “[a] civilised society recognises rights 
precisely to protect individuals from these grave harms.”83 
Second, the market-based assumptions that underlie cost-
benefit analysis seem poorly situated for assessing the value of 
human rights.  As part of the PREA regulatory approval process, 
the DOJ was required to monetize the value to detainees of not 
being subjected to sexual violence.  It did so through contingent 
valuation by “asking how much money the victims of rape would 
be willing to pay to avoid rape and also asking how much money 
these victims would be willing to accept in exchange for being 
raped.”84  Critics argued that such monetization of human rights 
is neither feasible nor accurate.  Several human rights groups, 
including Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Defense 
Center, submitted statements to DOJ addressing the cost-benefit 
analysis conducted during the PREA approval process.85  Human 
Rights Watch expressed several concerns in its DOJ submission, 
noting that “estimating the monetary ‘costs’ of crime is at best a 
fraught and imperfect effort, particularly when dealing with 
crimes such as sexual abuse whose principal cost is due to the 
pain, suffering, and quality of life diminution of the victims.”86  
Significantly, Human Rights Watch took this position even 
though it ultimately supported the PREA regulations.  The 
methodological limitations of such calculations seem evident.  
How can human rights be monetized or meaningfully calculated?  
 
83 Ronald Dworkin, It Is Absurd To Calculate Human Rights According to Cost-
Benefit Analysis, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2006/may/24/comment.politics. 
84 Heinzerling, supra note 82. 
85 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COMMENTS ON THE NATIONAL STANDARDS TO 
PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO PRISON RAPE, PROPOSED BY THE DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE ON FEBRUARY 3, 2011, at 1–2 (2011), https://www.hrw.org/sites/ 
default/files/related_material/Human%20Rights%20Watch%20Comments%20on%20
Prison%20Rape%20Standards.pdf; Letter from Paul Wright, Exec. Dir., Human 
Rights Def. Ctr. & Alex Friedmann, Assoc. Editor, Prison Legal News, to Robert 
Hinchman, Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 3, 2010) 
(on file with author); see also CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE ET AL., PROTECTING 
YOUTH IN THE PREA NATIONAL STANDARDS (2011), http://cclp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/PREA-Youth-Comments.pdf; JUST DET. INT’L, COMMENTS 
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON 
NATIONAL STANDARDS TO PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO PRISON RAPE (2011), 
https://justdetention.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Comments-Submitted-to-the-
Department-of-Justice-Notice.pdf. 
86 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 85, at 3. 
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And yet, advocates of cost-benefit analysis would argue 
valuation is possible.  In assessing whether the value of human 
life could be subject to economic analysis, for example, Thomas 
Schelling argued in 1968 that such efforts are both feasible and 
warranted.87  It is possible to monetize the value a society places 
on reducing mortality risks.  According to Schelling, “people have 
been dying for as long as they have been living; and where life 
and death are concerned we are all consumers.  We nearly all 
want our lives extended and are probably willing to pay for it.”88  
To this end, states have regularly used calculations regarding the 
value of a statistical life (VSL) to quantify the value placed on 
reductions in mortality risks.89  Federal agencies have used VSL 
calculations to assess countless regulatory proposals, including 
cigarette warning labels, food safety standards, and ejection 
mitigation requirements for vehicles.90  VSL calculations have 
even been used to assess the costs of war.91  In fact, these 
valuation efforts, which are regularly used by the federal 
government to make regulatory decisions that implicate human 
life, may offer the best example for using cost-benefit analysis to 
assess the feasibility of protecting human rights.92 
Admittedly, some human rights would pose unique 
challenges to cost-benefit analysis.93  There are several human 
rights norms that reflect unique interests and values within the 
international community.  In such cases, monetization may be 
particularly difficult. 
 
87 Thomas C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968). 
88 Id. at 128–29. 
89 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 
2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 201–08 (2000).  
90 SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 185–93. 
91 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR 
WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 94–96 (2008). But see MICHAEL 
WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 88–91 (2004). 
92 Using VSL calculations to assess the appropriateness of regulations that 
implicate human life has been subject to some criticism. See GILLES CARBONNIER, 
HUMANITARIAN ECONOMICS: WAR, DISASTER AND THE GLOBAL AID MARKET 106–07 
(2015); ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS 225–32 
(2010); Aceves, supra note 78, at 3; Trudy Ann Cameron, Euthanizing the Value of a 
Statistical Life, 4 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 161, 161–62 (2010). 
93 Cf. GHK CONSULTING LTD., HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMICS: TENSIONS AND 
POSITIVE RELATIONSHIPS 7–8 (2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PRO 
JECTS/Resources/40940-1331068268558/Report_Development_Fragility_Human_ 
Rights.pdf. 
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Consider the prohibition against genocide.  The Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was 
established because the international community recognized that 
the destruction of national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups 
represented a profound loss to all humanity.94  In fact, the loss of 
any such group was viewed as far more consequential than the 
loss associated with the sum of its individual members.95  As a 
result, the crime of genocide is seen as a unique crime that 
affects all humanity and implicates the peace and security of the 
international community.96  It is difficult to envision how cost-
benefit analysis could properly monetize the value in preventing 
genocide.97  Calculating the value of an entire national, ethnic, 
racial, or religious group—including its history, culture, 
tradition, and collective memory—would pose extraordinary 
challenges.  When human rights norms incorporate the moral 
interests and collective values of the international community, 
monetization may prove to be quite difficult. 
But again, advocates of cost-benefit analysis would argue 
that monetization of moral interests or complex values is, in fact, 
possible.  According to Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, even 
moral interests are subject to valuation and should be monetized 
in cost-benefit analysis.  “If people lose welfare because of the 
suffering or death of others . . . their loss ought to be counted.”98  
To disregard moral interests would ignore an important value 
that should be considered in any cost-benefit analysis.  It should 
not be surprising, then, that the federal regulatory review 
process supports such valuation efforts.  Executive Order 12,866 
compels federal agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis of 
significant regulatory actions, and it requires this analysis to 
consider both quantitative and qualitative measures.99  Executive 
Order 13,563 adds that agencies “may consider (and discuss 
 
94 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
95 See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY 
OF EVIL 268–69 (1963); BEREL LANG, GENOCIDE: THE ACT AS IDEA 28–29 (2017); 
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, 
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 91 (1944); David Luban, 
Arendt on the Crime of Crimes, 28 RATIO JURIS 307, 309 (2015). 
96 See Reservations to Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28). 
97 Cf. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
931, 934 (2000). 
98 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1813. 
99 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 1(a) (Sept. 30, 1993). 
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qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, 
including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive 
impacts.”100  OIRA also acknowledges that some costs and 
benefits may be difficult to monetize.101  In such cases, federal 
agencies are instructed to use their best efforts and to explain 
such costs and benefits through various assessments, including 
breakeven analysis.102  If a federal agency fails to consider these 
values in its calculations, OIRA may reject the proposed 
regulations.103  In addition, such action may also be a violation of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, which precludes agencies from 
acting arbitrarily.104 
CONCLUSION 
This Article recognizes that efforts to promote and protect 
human rights through references to morality or normative 
suasion have not always succeeded.  This explains one of the 
shortcomings of the modern human rights movement.105  Indeed, 
Jeremy Bentham’s acerbic critique of rights as “anarchical 
fallacies” and “nonsense upon stilts” still resonates over 170 
years later.106 
At a minimum, a new discourse is necessary—one that 
empowers advocates by reframing the debate over human rights.  
For these reasons, “[i]t is time to start over with an approach to 
promoting wellbeing . . . that is empirical rather than 
ideological.”107  Cost-benefit analysis thus offers a provocative 
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opportunity for the human rights movement.  However, its 
contributions must be balanced against both normative and 
pragmatic considerations.108  Philosophically, can rights be 
monetized without devaluing life and debasing human dignity?  
Practically, are monetization efforts feasible or valid?  Legally, do 
these efforts themselves violate human rights norms such as the 
principle of equality and the right to life?  In assessing the best 
path forward, human rights advocates must thus engage in their 
own cost-benefit analysis. 
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